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CHAPTER 19 
Domestic Relations and Persons 
WILLIAM J. GREENLER, JR. 
§19.1. Right to use funds of a mentally ill ward to pay for funeral 
of a parent. In Matter of Morizzo,l the question had been put to the 
Probate Court whether a guardian of a mentally ill person could be 
allowed or authorized to use the ward's funds to pay for the funeral 
of his parent, there being no estate nor other source of funds to pay 
for it. The probate judge ruled that he had no power to grant the 
authorization under the law, and the case was presented solely on the 
question of the interpretation of G.L., c. 201, § 38. This statute 
authorizes use of funds for the "support" of a dependent parent. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that "support" did not include burial 
and that, however undesirable this result might be, the remedy had to 
be left to the legislature. Such legislation may be desirable but the 
construction of the statute at hand seems inescapable. 
§19.2. Effect of a libel for divorce upon a prior decree of living 
apart for justifiable cause. The case of Meyer v. Meyer1 presented 
an interesting question of the application of the rule of Najjar v. 
Najjar.2 The Najjar case held that the bringing of a divorce libel 
alleging cruel and abusive treatment, even though the libel was never 
served, conclusively stopped a subsequent action for desertion because 
the prior libel amounted to a public statement that the libelant was 
no longer willing to cohabit with the libelee. With this in mind, Mr. 
Meyer, whose wife was living apart for justifiable cause by decree 
upon her petition which had alleged desertion, petitioned for a modi-
fication of that decree because she had since filed for divorce in New 
York alleging his adultery. He argued that the allegation of adultery 
showed conclusively that she was no longer willing to live with him 
and therefore negatived any further desertion, upon which her decree 
had been based. The Supreme Judicial Court distinguished the Najjar 
case. The question in the present case was only whether the wife was 
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stilI living apart for justifiable cause and the husband could not have 
a modification by virtue of having committed a further marital wrong. 
The distinction seems clearly valid. Had Mrs. Meyer now brought 
a divorce libel on grounds of desertion she would be barred by the 
rule of the Najjar and similar cases. But here she is seeking nothing. 
Had she now petitioned for a decree that she was living apart for 
justifiable cause she would clearly have grounds for it; hence Mr. 
Meyer is not entitled to have her prior decree revoked. 
§19.3. Right of libelee in divorce to recover against third party 
for wrongful enticement. In Whittet v. Hilton 1 it was held that the 
fact that a wife had obtained a divorce subsequent to a separation 
agreement did not bar the husband from recovering in tort for wrong-
ful enticement against another man, and that the separation agreement 
was rightly excluded. The defendant argued that the divorce decree 
proved that plaintiff had been guilty of a marital wrong and that the 
separation agreement showed he agreed to the divorce, from which it 
would seem to follow that he cannot now complain. The view of the 
Court, however, is almost cynically realistic in view of the present 
prevalence of divorce by agreement, and in that very real and practical 
view is unassailable. 
§19.4. Equity jurisdiction between husband and wife. By Resolves 
of 1957, c. 63, the General Court has directed the Judicial Council to 
investigate the advisability of giving the Probate Courts jurisdiction 
in all equity matters between husbands and wives and former husbands 
and wives. Probate Courts have heretofore had such jurisdiction only 
incidentally or ancillary to actions for separate support, divorce and 
desertion and living apart for justifiable cause.1 There has recently 
been considerable feeling that the equity jurisdiction of the Probate 
Courts should be enlarged, even to the point of making it general, to 
lessen the load of the Superior Court. This is a fairly moderate measure 
and the report of the Judicial Council should be of interest. 
§19.5. Amount of alimony. In Richman v. Richman1 the parties 
had been previously divorced and the husband had paid the wife 
$12,250. They were subsequently reconciled and she returned $11,000 
upon their remarriage. On the present libel, the Probate Court decreed 
that he should pay her $10,000 and $50 per week. Husband appealed 
solely on the question of the propriety of the $10,000 order. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the decree was not plainly wrong 
in view of evidence that the husband had a net worth of more than 
$100,000, a substantial income and a high standard of living, and that 
the wife was in poor health. The Court stated the rule that the factors 
to be considered are the needs of the wife, the financial worth of the 
§19.3. 1335 Mass. 164. 138 N.E.2d 596 (1956). 
§19.4. 1 C.L.. c. 215. §6. 
§19.5. 1335 Mass. 395. 140 N.E.2d 139 (1957). 
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husband, the station in life of the parties and their habitual mode of 
living. The principle of the case is not new, but its application may 
be helpful. 
§19.6. Non-support of wife and children. The 1957 session of the 
General Court stiffened the legal penalty for non-support by increasing 
the maximum to $500 fine and two years imprisonment or both, in 
prosecutions under G.L., c. 273, §l,1 The penalty had previously been 
$200 and one year. 
In a prosecution under this same section, the defendant demanded 
a blood test to exclude parentage under Section 12A.2 The lower 
court reported without decision the questions of whether Section 12A 
was applicable and whether expert testimony as to blood tests showing 
definite exclusion of paternity was admissible. The Court held in 
Commonwealth v. Stappen 8 that Section 12A was not applicable to 
prosecutions under Section 1, and that the defendant could not de-
mand a blood test because this was not a "proceeding to determine 
paternity." However, it was also held that expert testimony is ad-
missible whenever the issue is material. The presumption of legitimacy 
must be overcome beyond a reasonable doubt, but testimony of ex-
perts is one of the evidential means which would warrant such a 
finding. 
§19.7. Uniform enforcement of support proceedings. In Keene v. 
Toth,1 arising under G.L., c. 273A, it appeared that the plaintiff was 
now in Virginia and the defendant in Massachusetts. The petitioner 
(wife) had been awarded custody of their child in the District of 
Columbia. The parties had never lived together in Virginia, the 
initiating state, and the Uniform Reciprocal Act was not in force in 
the District of Columbia. The Supreme Judicial Court, rejecting the 
defendant's contention, held that while at common law the award of 
custody to the wife would terminate any duty of support, now such 
duty continues even though custody is in another by virtue of G.L., c. 
273, §8; since a duty of support exists, it was proper to impose a decree 
for support. 
The case indicates a very broad construction both of the Uniform 
Act and of the provisions of the last-cited section; the result is that even 
though these or similar proceedings could not have been maintained 
had the defendant remained in the District of Columbia, he was sub-
ject to them as soon as he came into Massachusetts. 
Also under this subject, a minor amendment to the Uniform Act 
should be noted,2 providing that service of process under this act may 
§19.6. 1 Acts of 1957, c. 49. 
2 Acts of 1954, c. 232, providing for blood grouping tests in "proceedings to 
determine paternity." See further discussion of this problem in § 23.5 infra. 
31957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 815, 143 N.E.2d 221. 
§19.7. 1335 Mass. 591, 141 N.E.2d 509 (1957). 
2 Acts of 1957, c. 74, amending G.L., c. 273A, §9. 
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be made by any officer authorized to serve criminal process. It should 
be borne in mind that the proceedings themselves, however, are not 
criminal in nature. 
§19.8. Support of children, aged and disabled persons. Various 
laws enacted during the SURVEY year concern this subject, allliberaliz-
ing the prior statutes. As regards Old Age Assistance,1 Acts of 1957, c. 
614 increased the exemption of income of children in determining 
eligibility for the aged person's aid, so that income of a single child 
living with the aged person is exempt to $2200 per year (formerly 
$2000), of a single child living apart $2450 per year (formerly $2250), 
and an employed married child $3750 per year (formerly $3250); in 
each case, one third of the excess is liable to contribution to the aged 
parent's support. These exemptions are increased by $600 for each 
dependent (formerly $500). 
Almost parallel provisions were made with regard to Aid to Disabled 
Persons.2 The increased exemption of the recipient for cash, bank 
accounts and life insurance is now $500 (formerly $300). In determin-
ing the liability of husband, parents and children of the recipient to 
contribute to his support, the following changes were made: income of 
an employed single child living with the recipient is exempt to $2200 
per year (formerly $2000), with one third of the excess liable to con-
tribution; board and lodging paid to the recipient parent is not con-
sidered a resource unless over $10 per week (formerly the excess over 
the cost was determinable under rules of the Department of Public 
Welfare); income of an employed single child living apart is exempt to 
$2450 per year (formerly $2250), and of an employed married child 
$3750 per year (formerly $3250), in each case with one third of the 
excess being liable to contribution. Additional exemption for depend-
ents was increased from $500 to $600. Provision was also added that 
the statement of the child under oath shall be accepted and no investi-
gation shall be made by the local board unless the child refuses to file 
or the local board "reasonably doubts the accuracy of" a statement 
filed; this is parallel to the provision already in the Old Age Assistance 
law.a 
Under Acts of 1957, c. 493, the father or mother of a child qualifying 
for Aid to Disabled Persons who are over 65, or the widowed mother 
if over 62, are exempt from the requirement of contributing to the 
child's support. 
§19.9. Adoptions. An important change in the law controlling 
adoptions was made by Acts of 1957, c. 184, amending G.L., c. 210, §2A, 
par. E, regarding appeals from the refusal of the Department of Public 
Welfare or its approved agency to approve a proposed adoption. The 
prior law had provided an intermediate appeal from an "arbitrary" 
refusal to the Advisory Board within the Department, before appeal 
§19.8. 1 G.L., c. U8A, especially §2A. 
2 Acts of 1957, c. 659, amending G.L., c. H8D, §§7, 8. 
8 G.L., c. U8A, §2A. 
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was available to the courts. It was assumed, though never decided, that 
the court also could only reverse a decision which was "arbitrary." 
Also, there was evidence that the Advisory Board of the Department 
had already considered the cases before the original approval was 
withheld, so that the intermediate appeal was an empty gesture. The 
new law eliminates the intermediate appeal and also the word "ar-
bitrary," and provides for appeal to the Probate Court, which has 
power to make the final decision. 
Acts of 1957, c. 187, regarding the confidentiality of adoption papers, 
corrects an inadequacy in the previous law 1 by requiring segregation 
of the papers before as well as after the entry of the decree, but extend-
ing the right of inspection to parties opposing the adoption and their 
counsel. The provisions for waiver of the impoundment by a judge 
of probate, or the register or an assistant are retained. 
Lastly, Acts of 1957, c. 274 adds to G.L., c. 210, §6A a provision for 
the issuance, upon request of either adopting parent, of a special 
certificate of adoption which will not contain the original or prior 
name of the adopted child nor the names of its natural parents. This 
special certificate is, quite apparently, meant to be in addition to the 
regular certificate, a copy of which is generally forwarded to the place 
of birth for amendment of the birth record. No form is prescribed in 
the act for the new "special" certificate. 
§19.9. 1 G.L., c. 210, §5C, inserted by Acts of 1951, c. 173. 
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